Winners and Losers of MLB's New Rules Lab
With the season now in full-swing the irony of this baseball blog has set in as well. Despite being a baseball blog, the topics of coverage here often relate to off-the-field matters and the sport writ large. As a result, posts and thoughts will be more intermittent.
However, one recent piece of news does present an interesting bit of thought fodder for this Saturday morning: MLB announced earlier this week that the Atlantic League of Professional Baseball— an independent professional league— will serve again as the league’s partner for experimental baseball rules. In 2019, the Atlantic League hosted a slew of experimental rules to include robo-umpires, restrictions on infield shifts (of course a call to this blog’s namesake), increasing base sizes, and the now MLB-adopted three-batter minimum for relief pitchers.
Besides the final rule, few of these had major effects on players and roster construction as the rules were more or less applied uniformly across different types of players. This year however, the Atlantic League will experiment with two new rules: The “double hook DH” which will inextricably link the designated hitter to the starting pitcher, thereby requiring the DH to be removed from the game when the starter is removed. The second rule will move the pitching mound back two-feet from the now sacred 60’6” mark. These rules, while seemingly innocuous may in fact having major considerations for roster management and actual jobs.
First, let’s take a look at the double-hook DH rule. The most obvious side-effect here is the birth of 15 new jobs for National League Designated Hitters. The Senior Circuit, long a bastion of tradition and forcing us to watch pitchers strike out multiple times per game, explain Waxahatchee swaps and double-switches, will finally add a designated hitter. This has be a long-standing fighting point for the MLB Players Association, which in its quest to advocate for its union members can rest its head easy knowing it has added 15 new jobs in a league with a capped number of employees.
However, this growth is not without a casualty elsewhere. Namely, in an era where starting pitchers have thrown fewer and fewer innings and teams have been increasingly dependent on massively robust bullpens, the might of the reliever may be on the decline. With the starting pitcher now tied to a designated hitter, removing the starting pitcher would come with the double jeopardy of removing offense and requiring smart lineup management moving forward. As a result, teams are incentivized toward keeping starting pitchers in the game longer and reducing dependence on reliever. MLB rosters are not currently constructed in a way that accommodates this change currently and would have to adjust.
Another casualty of this rule however is the opener. This modern strategy of deploying the one-inning “relief pitcher” for the first inning before moving to the traditional bulk-inning “starter” attempted to get through the opponents top-hitters with fire power. However, with a one-inning opener being technically designated as the “starting pitcher” the pitching team may lose its DH in the first inning. Should the new rules take root in MLB, the opener is without a doubt dead.
Moving on to the second rule, moving the mound back two-feet, the effects are a bit more nuanced. Per MLB’s report, moving the mound back two feet would bring down the velocity of the league average fastball from 93.3mph to 91.6mph, nearly 2mph slower. Most obviously, one-dimensional high-velocity arms are poised to lose from moving the mound. Players that were dependent on velocity would almost overnight lose the edge that made them dominant pitchers and potentially lose their roster spots.
Here, it’s important to note the intention behind this rule change. MLB has noticed that (plot twist) baseball is boring to the masses. In order to remedy this, the league has identified high octane offense as the most viable solution. Moving the mound back makes pitchers less effective and less effective pitchers means more offense… or does it?
The premise that moving the mound back would increase offense is a potential dubious one. With two more feet of space between the rubber and the plate, there’s two more feet worth of space for breaking balls to move, two more feet worth of space for sliders to dart out of the zone, two more feet of space for curveballs to drop in, and two more feet of space for fastballs to rise over bats. Ultimately, there is a class of pitchers that is positioned to potentially benefit from this rules change. Imagine Devin Williams’ changeup if it had two more feet to fool batters. While fastball heavy pitchers may lose their edge, pitchers that are able to command the zone and rely on their breaking balls may stand to benefit and the true offensive boost may not be realized.
There are of course other ways to increase offense in baseball. Most obviously this would call changes to the eponymous device that gives the sport its name: the baseball. And here, MLB has interestingly taken a self-defeating position by deadening the baseball this last season. After a few seasons of suspicion around secretly altering the composition of the baseball, MLB announced this offseason that it would slightly deaden the baseballs and reduce the coefficient of restitution (the bounciness) of the ball. Less bouncy means less spring off the bat and fewer home runs.
Alternatively, MLB could pursue the path of altering the mound. But instead of moving it back, MLB could lower the mound. A lower mound would reduce the down-hill momentum generated by pitchers and have a similar effect on reducing velocity. However, this would come without the same side-effects that enhance pitch movement and potentially counteract the intended goal.
Whichever way MLB decides to move, there are significant considerations and implications that come along with the intended plan. Moving to a hybrid-double-hook DH may bring some offense to the NL but it would also change the way rosters are managed and constructed. Moving the mound back may (or may not) increase offense, but it would also change the way pitchers are evaluated. Of course, MLB’s goal should be to do as little harm as possible. If the goal is to increase offense, doing so should come with as little consequence to other aspects of the game. As designed right now, MLB’s proposed experiment would have some unintended consequences. These are not insurmountable of course, but an analysis of the changes without full understanding of how the game will evolve would be shortsighted.